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Abstract
We discuss relationships among the existence property, the disjunction property,
and their weak variants in the setting of intermediate predicate logics. We deal
with the weak and sentential existence properties, and the Z-normality, which is
a weak variant of the disjunction property. These weak variants were presented in
the author’s previous paper [16]. In the present paper, the Kripke sheaf semantics
is used.
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Introduction
We discuss relationships among the existence property (EP), disjunction
property (DP), and their weak variants in the setting of intermediate pred-
icate logics by making use of the Kripke sheaf semantics. We deal with the
weak and sentential existence properties, and the Z-normality, which is a
weak variant of the disjunction property. These weak variants were treated
in the author’s previous paper [16] in which intermediate predicate logics
∗Supported in part by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) No. 24540120, Japan
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having EP but lacking DP were constructed. This result revealed that EP
and DP are independent in intermediate predicate logics1.
An intermediate predicate logic L is said to have EP, if the following
condition holds: for every ∃xA(x), L ⊢ ∃xA(x) implies that there is an
individual variable v such that L ⊢ A(v). (For the precise definition of EP,
see Definition 1.2.) An intermediate predicate logic L is said to have DP, if
the following condition holds: for every A and every B, L ⊢ A ∨B implies
that L ⊢ A or L ⊢ B. In [16], we constructed intermediate predicate logics
having EP but laking DP by making use of two variants of EP. One variant
is an extremely strong EP, which can be meaningful in super-intuitionistic
predicate logics; namely, for every ∃xA(x), L ⊢ ∃xA(x) implies that there
exists a fresh individual variable v such that L ⊢ A(v). This property is so
extreme that none of the intermediate predicate logics has it. However, if
we restrict ∃xA(x) to a sentence, we obtain one weak variant of EP, which
we call here the sentential existence property (sEP).
Another one is a weak EP; an intermediate predicate logic L is said to
have the weak existence property (wEP), if for every ∃xA(x), L ⊢ ∃xA(x)
implies that there exist finitely many terms t1, . . . , tn in the vocabulary
of ∃xA(x), the disjunction A(t1) ∨ · · · ∨ A(tn) is provable in L. (For the
precise definition of wEP in the setting of intermediate predicate logics, see
Definition 1.4.) In [16], we proved EP of some logics by showing wEP and
DP2.
Moreover, we introduced a weak variant of DP called Z-normality (For
the definition of Z-normality, see Definition 1.6). The Z-normality is a
natural property for semantically reasonable logics (cf. Proposition 2.4),
and is important in the consideration of the relation between EP and DP.
Namely, every Z-normal logic with EP always has DP.
In this paper, we show relationships among EP, wEP, sEP, Z-normality,
and their combinations in intermediate predicate logics.
The essential ideas come from Nakamura [9]’s and Minari [8]’s construc-
tions. They used the Kripke frame semantics, but we use the Kripke sheaf
semantics, since Kripke sheaves enable us to handle our modifications of
models easily.
1This is a negative solution to one of problems of Umezawa, Minari, and Ono ([18,
8, 11]): Does EP imply DP?
2This procedure is based on the idea of in Prawitz [12], Komori [7], and Minari [8];
they proved EP of intuitionistic predicate logic and some intermediate predicate logics
in this way.
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§1 contains some preliminaries to make this paper rather self-contained.
The main theorem is presented at the end of §1. §2 provides semantical pre-
liminaries. Readers having some knowledge of the Kripke sheaf semantics,
especially one of the author’s [13], [14, §1], [15], or Gabbay-Shehtman-
Skvortsov [3, Chapter 3], may skip §2.1. Semantical tools for proving the
main result are given in §2.2. The proof of main result is presented in §3.
The last §4 is devoted to concluding remarks.
1. Preliminaries and the main Theorem
We fix a pure first-order language L, which consists of logical connectives
∨ (disjunction), ∧ (conjunction), ⊃ (implication), and ¬ (negation), and
quantifiers ∃ (existential quantifier) and ∀ (universal quantifier), a denu-
merable list of individual variables and a denumerable list of m-ary predi-
cate variables for each m < ω. The 0-ary predicate variables are identified
with propositional variables. Note that L contains neither constants nor
function symbols, nor the equality (=). For every formula A, we denote
the set of all variables free in A by FV (A).
Roughly speaking, intermediate logics are logics located between intu-
itionistic and classical logics.
Definition 1.1. (cf. Ono[11]) A set L of formulas of L is said to be an
intermediate predicate logic, if L satisfies the following three conditions:
(Q1) L contains all formulas provable in intuitionistic predicate logic H∗;
(Q2) every formula in L is provable in classical predicate logic C∗;
(Q3) L is closed under the rule of modus ponens (from A and A ⊃ B,
infer B), the rule of generalization (from A, infer ∀xA), and uniform
substitution3 for predicate variables.
A set L of formulas of L is said to be a super-intuitionistic predicate
logic, if L satisfies (Q1) and (Q3).
We sometimes use the phrase “A is provable in L” (in symbol: L ⊢ A)
when A ∈ L. We identify a logic with the sets of formulas provable in it. For
every formula A, the smallest super-intuitionistic predicate logic containing
A is denoted by H∗ + A. Hereafter, we sometimes omit “intermediate
predicate” and “super-intuitionistic predicate” for the sake of simplicity.
3Cf. the operator Sˇ in Church [1].
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Definition 1.2. (cf. Kleene [6]) Formulas A and B are congruent, if A is
obtained from B by alphabetic change of bound variables which does not
turn any free occurrences of newly bound variables (cf. Kleene [5, p.153]).
A logic L is said to have the existence property (EP), if for every ∃xA(x),
L ⊢ ∃xA(x) implies that there exist a formula A˜(x) which is congruent to
A(x) and an individual variable v such that v is free for x in A˜(x) and
L ⊢ A˜(v).
Note that congruent formulas are equivalent to each other in intuition-
istic logic. In the rest of this paper, we identify congruent formulas without
mentioning it, whenever this is not likely to cause confusion (cf. Gabbay-
Shehtman-Skvortsov [3, Ch.2]). Then, the definition of EP can be written
simply as that in Introduction.
In [16], we used the following extremely strong EP in super-intuitionistic
predicate logic: for every ∃xA(x), L ⊢ ∃xA(x) implies that there exists a
fresh individual variable v such that L ⊢ A(v). Clearly, this property is so
extreme that no intermediate predicate logic has this property. However,
if we restrict ∃xA(x) to a sentence, we obtain one weak variant of EP:
Definition 1.3. A logic L is said to have the sentential existence property
(sEP), if for every sentence ∃xA(x) provable in L, there exists a fresh
individual variable v such that A(v) is provable in L.
Next, we introduce the weak existence property (wEP). This property
was originally considered in Prawitz [12] in the language with constant
symbols but without function symbols4 to establish EP of intuitionistic
predicate logic. Komori [7] and Minari [8] also used this property to estab-
lish EP of some intermediate predicate logics. Note that we (and Komori
and Minari) are working with the pure language L having neither constant
symbols nor function symbols. Then, for each formula A, the set FV (A) is
essentially the set of all terms constructed with the vocabulary of A. Thus,
we have the following definition adapted to the language L.
Definition 1.4. A logic L is said to have the weak existence property
(wEP), if for every formula ∃xA(x) provable in L and every finite non-
empty set {v1, . . . , vn} of individual variables such that FV (∃xA(x)) ⊆
{v1, . . . , vn}, the disjunction A(v1) ∨ · · · ∨A(vn) is provable in L.
4And it was extended to that with the language with function symbols in Doorman [2].
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Then, we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 1.5. (1) EP implies wEP.
(2) wEP implies sEP.
Proof: (1): Suppose that a logic L has EP, and L ⊢ ∃xA(x). Let
{v1, . . . , vn} be an arbitrary finite set of variables such that FV (∃xA(x)) ⊆
{v1, . . . , vn}. Since L has EP, there exists a variable w such that L ⊢ A(w).
If w is a variable free in ∃xA(x), it is clear that A(v1)∨· · ·∨A(vn) is provable
in L. If w is a fresh variable, then, by the rule of generalization, we have
L ⊢ ∀wA(w). Therefore, we have L ⊢ A(v1), i.e., L ⊢ A(v1) ∨ · · · ∨A(vn).
(2): Suppose that a logic L has wEP, and that ∃xA(x) is a sentence
provable in L. Let w be a fresh variable. Since FV (∃xA(x)) is empty, we
have FV (∃xA(x)) ⊆ {w}. Then, A(w) is provable in L. 
Now, we introduce the Z-normality, which is a weak variant of DP in
intermediate predicate logics.
Definition 1.6. ([16]) Consider the following inference rule (ZR):
A ∨ (p(x) ⊃ p(y))
A
(ZR)
• subject to: p is a unary predicate variable, and x and y are mutually
distinct individual variables, and p, x, and y do not occur in A.
A logic L is said to be Z-normal, if L is closed under (ZR).
The rule (ZR) is admissible both in C∗ and in H∗. Since p(x) ⊃ p(y) is
not provable in C∗, we have that DP implies Z-normality in intermediate
predicate logics. Since C∗ does not have DP, the converse does not hold,
i.e., Z-normality does not imply DP. The Z-normality is a natural property
for reasonable logics (cf. Proposition 2.4), and plays an important role in
the consideration of the relation between EP and DP. Namely:
Theorem 1.7 ([16]). If a Z-normal logic has EP, then it has DP.
Then, a logic L has EP and is Z-normal if and only if L has both EP
and DP, and if and only if L has both wEP and DP. In symbol:
EP + Z-normal↔ EP +DP↔ wEP +DP
Thus, we illustrate the situation in Figure 1. More precisely:
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Fig. 1.
Theorem 1.8. The Figure 1 comprehensively describes the situation. There
are no additional →’s of implication in Figure 1.
The aim of this paper is to show Theorem 1.8. It suffices to show that
the following four kinds of logics exit:
• L1 having EP, but not being Z-normal,
• L2 having wEP and being Z-normal, but lacking EP and DP,
• L3 having sEP and DP, but lacking wEP,
• L4 having DP, but lacking sEP.
In [16], we constructed logics5 having EP but lacking DP. These logics
are not Z-normal by Theorem 1.7. Hence one of these logics can be used
as L1. Nakamura [9] and Minari [8] proved that DP does not imply EP by
constructing logics having DP but lacking EP. In fact, they showed that
there are logics which have DP but lack sEP. Hence, their logics serve as
L4. Thus, it remains to find L2 and L3. In §3, we will give two concrete
finitely axiomatizable logics L2 and L3 and show that they fulfill the above
requirements. Our idea of the proof is essentially based on Nakamura [9]
5Some of them are proved to be finitely axiomatizable.
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and Minari [8], with some modifications using the Kripke-sheaf semantics.
(cf. also [13].)
2. Kripke sheaf semantics
First, we give a short explanation of the Kripke sheaf semantics for inter-
mediate predicate logics. Then, we give semantical constructions and a
Lemma for proving Theorem 1.8.
2.1. Kripke sheaves
For every non-empty set U , the language obtained from L by adding the
name u for each u ∈ U is denoted by L[U ]. In what follows, we will
sometimes use the same letter u for the name u of u. Let U and V be
non-empty sets, ϕ : U → V a mapping. For each formula A of L[U ],
by Aϕ we denote a formula obtained from A by replacing all occurrences
of u by the name ϕ(u) of ϕ(u) for each u ∈ U . That is, ϕ naturaly
induces a translation of L[U ] into L[V ]. This notation is also used for
the substitution of names of individuals in a set V for free occurrences of
individual variables. Namely, Aϕ with a mapping ϕ of a set {xi1 , xi2 , . . . }
of individual variables to U denotes the formula of L[U ] obtained from A
by replacing all free occurrences of xij by the name ϕ(xij ) of ϕ(xij ) ∈ U
for each individual variable xij in {xi1 , xi2 , . . . }.
Definition 2.1. A partially ordered set M = (M,≤) with the least ele-
ment 0M is said to be a Kripke base. We can regard a Kripke base M as a
category in the usual way. Let Sets be the category of all sets. A covariant
functor D from a Kripke base M to Sets is called a domain-sheaf over M,
if D(a) is non-empty for every a ∈M . That is,
(DS1) D(a) 6= ∅ for every a ∈M ,
(DS2) for every a, b ∈ M with a ≤ b, a mapping Dab : D(a) → D(b) is
associated,
(DS3) Daa is the identity mapping idD(a) of D(a) for every a ∈M ,
(DS4) Dac = Dbc ◦Dab for every a, b, c ∈M with a ≤ b ≤ c.
A pair K = 〈M, D〉 of a Kripke base M and a domain-sheaf D over M
is called a Kripke sheaf . If every Dab (a ≤ b) is the set-inclusion, 〈M, D〉
is said to be a Kripke frame.
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Intuitively, each D(a) is the individual domain of the world a ∈M . If
a ≤ b, then each d ∈ D(a) has its inheritor in D(b), i.e., Dab(d) ∈ D(b).
For each a ∈M and each b ∈M with a ≤ b, every sentence A of L[D(a)] is
translated into the sentence ADab of L[D(b)], which is called the inheritor
of A at b.
A binary relation |= between each a ∈M and each atomic sentence of
L[D(a)] is said to be a valuation on K = 〈M, D〉, if for every a, b ∈M and
every atomic sentence A of L[D(a)], a |= A and a ≤ b imply b |= ADab . We
inductively extend |= to a relation between each a ∈M and each sentence
of L[D(a)] in the following way:
• a |= A ∧B if and only if a |= A and a |= B,
• a |= A ∨B if and only if a |= A or a |= B,
• a |= A ⊃ B if and only if
for every b ∈M with a ≤ b, either b 6|= ADab or b |= BDab ,
• a |= ¬A if and only if for every b ∈M with a ≤ b, b 6|= ADab ,
• a |= ∀xA(x) if and only if
for every b ∈M with a ≤ b and every u ∈ D(b), b |= ADab(u),
• a |= ∃xA(x) if and only if
there exists u ∈ D(a) such that a |= A(u).
A pair (K, |=) of a Kripke sheaf K and a valuation |= on it is said to be
a Kripke model . A formula A of L is said to be true in a Kripke model
(K, |=), if 0M |= A, where A is the universal closure of A. A formula of
L is said to be valid in a Kripke sheaf K, if it is true in (K, |=) for every
valuation |= on K. The set of formulas of L that are valid in K is denoted
by L(K). The following two propositions are fundamental properties of the
Kripke sheaf semantics (cf. Suzuki [13, 14]).
Proposition 2.2. For every a, b ∈ M , and every sentence A of L[D(a)],
if a |= A and a ≤ b, then b |= ADab .
Proposition 2.3. For each Kripke sheaf K, the set L(K) is a super-
intuitionistic predicate logic.
A logic L is said to be characterized by a Kripke sheaf K, if L = L(K).
A logic L is said to be characterized by a class C of Kripke sheaves, if
L =
⋂
{L(K) ; K ∈ C}. Let F be a class of Kripke bases. A predicate
logic L is said to be characterized by F , if L is characterized by the class
{〈M, D〉 ; M ∈ F and D is a domain-sheaf over M}.
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In Introduction, we stated that Z-normality is a natural property for se-
mantically reasonable logics. More precisely, we have the following Proposi-
tion. This Proposition suggests that most of logics manageable with Kripke
sheaves are automatically Z-normal.
Proposition 2.4. (1) Suppose that a super-intuitionistic predicate logic L
is Z-normal. Then, L is characterized by a class of Kripke sheaves if and
only if there exists a class C of Kripke sheaves such that L is characterized
by C and each member K = 〈M, D〉 of C has at least two elements in
D(0M).
(2) If a super-intuitionistic predicate logic L is characterized by a class
of Kripke bases, then L is Z-normal.
2.2. Semantical toolkit
Here we introduce two constructions of Kripke sheaves from given Kripke
sheaves. The ideas of these constructions can be found in Nakamura [9]
and Minari [8] originally for Kripke frames.
Definition 2.5. (cf. Minari [8]) Let K = 〈M, D〉 be a Kripke sheaf, V a
non-empty set. Suppose we have a mapping f : V → D(0M) where 0M is
the least element of M. Take a fresh element 0 and define a Kripke base
0 ↑ M as the partially ordered set obtained from M by adding 0 as the
new least element. Then, 0 ↑M and f naturally induce a Kripke sheaf by
associating the domain-sheaf D⊲f :
D⊲f (a) =
{
V if a = 0,
D(a) if a ∈M;
for every a ≤ b,
(D⊲f )ab =


idV if a = b = 0,
D0M b ◦ f if a = 0 and b ∈M,
Dab if a, b ∈M.
This Kripke sheaf is denoted by V ⊲f K, (or simply by V ⊲K), which we
call the pointed extension of K. We omit the subscript •f , whenever this
is not likely to cause confusion.
Definition 2.6. (cf. Minari [8] and Nakamura [9]) Let K1 = 〈M1, D1〉
and K2 = 〈M2, D2〉 be Kripke sheaves with the least elements 01 and 02,
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respectively, V a non-empty set. Suppose we have two mappings f1 : V →
D1(01) and f2 : V → D2(02). Take a fresh element 0 and define a Kripke
base 0 ↑ (M1⊕M2) as the partially ordered set obtained from the disjoint
union of M1 and M2 by adding 0 as the new least element. Then, 0 ↑
(M1 ⊕M2), f1, and f2 naturally induce a Kripke sheaf V ↑f1,f2 (K1 ⊕K2)
(or simply, V ↑ (K1 ⊕K2)) by associating the domain-sheaf D
↑
f1,f2
:
D↑f1,f2(a) =
{
V if a = 0,
D(a) if a ∈M1 ⊕M2;
for every a ≤ b,
(D↑f1,f2)ab =


idV if a = b = 0,
(Di)0i b ◦ fi if a = 0 and b ∈Mi (i = 1, 2),
(Di)ab if a ∈Mi (i = 1, 2).
The Kripke sheaf V ↑f1,f2 (K1 ⊕ K2) is called the pointed join of K1 and
K2 (with V , f1, and f2). We omit the subscript •f1,f2 , whenever this is not
likely to cause confusion.
Definition 2.7. For every Kripke model (K, |=), there exists at least one
valuation |=′ on V⊲K such that |= and |=′ concide on K. Such a valuation
is said to be an extension of |=. Similarly, we define an extension |= of |=1
and |=2 on V ↑ (K1 ⊕ K2) for each pair (K1, |=1) and (K2, |=2) of Kripke
models.
Next, we prepare a Lemma, which we will use in § 3.
Let p be an n-ary predicate variable, q a propositional variable. We
denote the propositional formula q ⊃ q by ⊤. Since ⊤ has no free vari-
able, we can uniformly substitute ⊤ for p(v1, . . . , vn) in any formula A; the
resulting formula is denoted by A⊤ (i.e., Sˇ
p(v1,...,vn)
⊤
A|).
Lemma 2.8. Let (K, |=) = (〈M, D〉, |=) be a Kripke model, p an n-ary
predicate variable. Suppose that 0M |= ∀x1 . . . ∀xnp(x1, . . . , xn). Then, for
every formula A of L, every m ∈M, every mapping ϕ of FV (A) to D(m),
it holds that m |= Aϕ if and only if m |= (A⊤)ϕ.
Proof: We show this Lemma by induction on A. If A is atomic, then
the statement holds by the assumption. Suppose that A is of the form
¬B. If m 6|= ¬Bϕ, then there exists m′ ∈ M such that m ≤ m′ and m′ |=
(Bϕ)Dmm′ . Note that (Bϕ)Dmm′ is B(Dmm′◦ϕ). By induction hypothesis,
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we have m′ |= (B⊤)(Dmm′◦ϕ), that is, m′ |= ((B⊤)ϕ)Dmm′ . Then, it holds
thatm 6|= ¬(B⊤)ϕ. This reasoning can be applied backward. Next, suppose
that A is of the form ∀zB(z). If m 6|= (∀zB(z))ϕ, then there are m′ ∈ M
and d ∈ D(m′) such that m ≤ m′ and m′ 6|= (Bϕ)Dmm′ (d). Note that
(Bϕ)Dmm′ (d) is B(Dmm′◦ϕ)(d). Define a mapping ψ of FV (B(z)) to D(m′)
by:
ψ(v) =
{
Dmm′ ◦ ϕ(v) if v is not z,
d if v is z.
Then, we have m′ 6|= B(z)ψ. By induction hypothesis, it holds that m′ 6|=
(B(z)⊤)ψ. Namely, m′ 6|= ((B⊤)ϕ)Dmm′ (d), and hence m 6|= (∀zB(z)⊤)ϕ.
This reasoning can be applied backward. Other cases can be treated simi-
larly. 
3. Proof of the Theorem
Let p and q be mutually distinct propositional variables, r a binary pred-
icate variable. Define two sentences Lin, and T1, and a formula T (a, b, w)
as follows:
Lin : (p ⊃ q) ∨ (q ⊃ p)
T1 : ∀x∀y∃z(r(x, y) ⊃ r(x, z) ∧ r(y, z))
T (a, b, w) : T1 ∧ r(a, b) ⊃ r(a, w) ∧ r(b, w).
Next, define two logics as follows:
L2 = H∗ + Lin.
L3 = H∗ + ∃wT (a, b, w).
Since Lin and ∃wT (a.b.w) are provable in classical logic C∗, both of
L2 and L3 are intermediate logics.
Lemma 3.1. The logic L2 is a Z-normal intermediate logic having wEP,
but lacking EP and DP.
Proof: Minari [8] proved that L2 has wEP and lacks EP and DP. We
show that L2 is Z-normal
6. Suppose that A is not provable in L2. We will
6It is obvious by the definition that L2 lacks DP. By Proposition 1.7, the failure of
EP follows from the Z-normality of L2.
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show that L2 0 A∨(p(x) ⊃ p(y)), where the unary predicate variable p and
individual variables x and y do not occur in A. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that A contains no free variables other than v1, . . . , vn,
and we write A as A(v1, . . . , vn) . Then, by the strong completeness theo-
rem of H∗ with respect to the Kripke semantics, there is a Kripke model
(K, |=) = (〈M, D〉, |=) such that:
(M1) 0M |= (X ⊃ Y ) ∨ (Y ⊃ X), for all formulas X and Y of L,
(M2) there are d1, . . . , dn ∈ D(0M) such that 0M 6|= A(d1, . . . , dn),
where 0M is the least element of M. Take two fresh elements e1 and e2,
and define a set V = {d1, . . . , dn, e1, e2} and a mapping f : V → D(0M) by
f(d) =
{
d if d = di for some i = 1, . . . , n,
d1 if d = e1 or d = e2.
Then, we have the pointed extension V⊲f K with the new least element 0.
By extending |=, we have a valuation on V ⊲f K, which we denote by the
same symbol |=. Clearly, by (M2), we have 0 6|= A(d1, . . . , dn). Modifying
|=, we define |=′ as follows:
For each m ∈ 0 ↑M and each atomic sentence B of L[D⊲(m)],
m |=′ B if and only if{
m |= B if B is not of the form p(d),
m 6= 0 or d = e1 if B is of the form p(d).
Then, it is easy to see that 0 6|=′ A(d1, . . . , dn)∨ (p(e1) ⊃ p(e2)). It remains
to show that
(∗1) 0 |=′ (X ⊃ Y ) ∨ (Y ⊃ X) for all formulas X and Y of L.
By the definition of |=′, we have 0M |=
′ ∀xp(x). Then, by Lemma 2.8, we
have that, for every sentence W of L[D(0M)],
0M |=
′ W if and only if 0M |=
′ W⊤.
Since W⊤ contains no occurrence of p, two valuations, |=′ and |= on K
coincide with each other for such sentences. Therefore,
0M |=
′ W⊤ if and only if 0M |=W
⊤.
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Recall that (X ⊃ Y ) ∨ (Y ⊃ X)
⊤
is also the universal closure of an instance
of Lin. Taking this sentence as W above, by (M1), we have:
(M3) 0M |=
′ (X ⊃ Y ) ∨ (Y ⊃ X) for all X and Y of L.
Now, we show (∗1). Suppose otherwise. Then, there exist X and Y
such that 0 6|=′ (X ⊃ Y ) ∨ (Y ⊃ X). There exist m ∈ 0 ↑ M and ϕ :
FV (X)∪FV (Y )→ D⊲(m) such that m 6|=′ (Xϕ ⊃ Y ϕ)∨ (Y ϕ ⊃ Xϕ). By
(M3), this m must be 0. Hence, 0 6|=′ Xϕ ⊃ Y ϕ and 0 6|=′ Y ϕ ⊃ Xϕ. Then,
there are k and ℓ in 0 ↑M such that
(M4) k |=′ (Xϕ)D
⊲
0 k , k 6|=′ (Y ϕ)D
⊲
0 k , ℓ |=′ (Y ϕ)D
⊲
0 ℓ , and ℓ 6|=′ (Xϕ)D
⊲
0 ℓ .
Assume that 0M ≤ k, ℓ. Then, we have:
D⊲0 k ◦ ϕ = (D
⊲
0M k
◦D⊲0 0M) ◦ ϕ = D
⊲
0M k
◦ (D⊲0 0M ◦ ϕ) .
Thus, (Xϕ)D
⊲
0 k and (Y ϕ)D
⊲
0 k are (X(D
⊲
0 0M
◦ϕ)
)
D⊲
0M k and (Y (D
⊲
0 0M
◦ϕ)
)
D⊲
0M k ,
respectively. By (M4), it holds that 0M 6|=
′ X(D
⊲
0 0M
◦ϕ) ⊃ Y (D
⊲
0 0M
◦ϕ)
. Sim-
ilarly, by replacing k by ℓ, we have: 0M 6|=
′ Y (D
⊲
0 0M
◦ϕ) ⊃ X(D
⊲
0 0M
◦ϕ)
. That
is, 0M 6|=
′ {(X ⊃ Y ) ∨ (Y ⊃ X)}(D
⊲
0 0M
◦ϕ)
. This contradicts (M3). There-
fore, k = 0 or ℓ = 0. Without loss of generality, we may assume that k = 0.
Then, 0 = k ≤ ℓ. From (M4), we have that 0 |=′ Xϕ and ℓ 6|=′ (Xϕ)D
⊲
0 ℓ .
This contradicts Proposition 2.2. Thus we have established (∗1). 
Lemma 3.2. The logic L3 is an intermediate logic having sEP and DP, but
lacking wEP.
Proof: Since T (a, b, a) ∨ T (a, b, b) is not provable in C∗, L3 fails to have
wEP. It suffices to show that L3 has sEP and DP.
First, we show that L3 has sEP. Suppose that ∃xA(x) is a sentence.
Let v be a fresh individual variable free for x in A(x). Suppose, moreover,
that L3 0 A(v). Then, by the strong completeness theorem of H∗, there is
a Kripke model (K, |=) = (〈M, D〉, |=) such that
(L1) 0M |= X for every instance X of T in L,
(L2) there exists d ∈ D(0M) such that 0M 6|= A(d).
Put V = {d}, and make the pointed extension V ⊲K. By extending |= to
V ⊲K, we have 0 6|= A(d). Thus, 0 6|= ∃xA(x). It remains to show that
(∗2) 0 |= X for every instance X of T in L.
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Suppose otherwise. Then, there exists a formula R(a, b, v) of L such that
R(a, b, v) contains no free variables other than a, b, and v7 and that the
universal closure of
∃w[{∀x∀y∃z(R(x, y, v) ⊃ R(x, z, v) ∧R(y, z, v))} ∧R(a, b, v)
⊃ R(a, w, v) ∧R(b, w, v)]
is not true in V ⊲K. By the reasoning similar to that in Lemma 3.1, we
have 0 6|= ∃w[{∀x∀y∃z(R(x, y, d) ⊃ R(x, z, d) ∧ R(y, z, d))} ∧ R(d, d, d) ⊃
R(d, w, d)∧R(d, w, d)], sinceD⊲(0) = {d}. Then, 0 6|= {∀x∀y∃z(R(x, y, d) ⊃
R(x, z, d) ∧R(y, z, d))} ∧R(d, d, d) ⊃ R(d, d, d) ∧R(d, d, d)]. This is a con-
tradiction. Thus we have (∗2) and, hence L3 has sEP.
Next, we show that L3 has DP. Suppose that L3 0 A and L3 0 B.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that A and B contain no free
variables other than v1, . . . , vn, and we may write A and B as A(v1, . . . , vn)
and B(v1, . . . , vn), respectively. Then, by the strong completeness theo-
rem of H∗, there are two Kripke models (K1, |=1) = (〈M1, D1〉, |=1) and
(K2, |=2) = (〈M2, D2〉, |=2) such that:
(L3) for i = 1, 2, it holds that 0i |= X for every instance X of T in L,
(L4-1) there are d1, . . . , dn ∈ D1(01) such that 01 6|=1 A(d1, . . . , dn),
(L4-2) there are e1, . . . , en ∈ D2(02) such that 02 6|=2 B(e1, . . . , en),
where 0i is the least element of Mi (i = 1, 2). Let V be the cartesian
productD1(01)×D2(02). Then, we have the pointed join V ↑pi1,pi2 (K1⊕K2)
by making use of the canonical projections πi : D1(01)×D2(02)→ Di(0i)
(i = 1, 2). Check that the inheritor of A((d1, e1), . . . , (dn, en)) at 01 is
A(d1, . . . , dn), and that the inheritor of B((d1, e1), . . . , (dn, en)) at 02 is
B(e1, . . . , en). Extending |= to the pointed join, by (L4-1) and (L4-2), we
have
0 6|= A((d1, e1), . . . , (dn, en)) ∨B((d1, e1), . . . , (dn, en)).
It remains to show that
(∗3) 0 |= X for every instance X of T in L.
7In general, the v may be a finite (possibly empty) sequence of individual variables.
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Suppose otherwise. With the same discussion as above, there exist a for-
mula R(a, b, v) of L and elements c1, c2, c3 ∈ V such that R(a, b, v) contains
no free variables other than a, b, and v, and that
(L5) 0 6|= ∃w[{∀x∀y∃z(R(x, y, c3) ⊃ R(x, z, c3)∧R(y, z, c3))} ∧R(c1, c2, c3)
⊃ R(c1, w, c3) ∧R(c2, w, c3)].
By (L3), there are d1 ∈ D1(01) and d2 ∈ D2(02) such that
0i |= {∀x∀y∃z(R(x, y, c
i
3) ⊃ R(x, z, c
i
3) ∧ R(y, z, c
i
3))} ∧ R(c
i
1, c
i
2, c
i
3) ⊃
R(ci1, di, c
i
3) ∧ R(c
i
2, di, c
i
3), where c
i
j = πi(cj) for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, 3.
Put d = (d1, d2) ∈ V . Then, by (L5), we have 0 |= {∀x∀y∃z(R(x, y, c3) ⊃
R(x, z, c3) ∧ R(y, z, c3))} ∧ R(c1, c2, c3) and 0 6|= R(c1, d, c3) ∧ R(c2, d, c3).
The former implies that there exists an element e ∈ V such that 0 |=
R(c1, e, c3)∧R(c2, e, c3). Therefore, we have 0 |= ∃w[{∀x∀y∃z(R(x, y, c3) ⊃
R(x, z, c3) ∧ R(y, z, c3))} ∧ R(c1, c2, c3) ⊃ R(c1, w, c3) ∧ R(c2, w, c3)]. This
contradicts (L5). Thus, we have (∗3). 
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have determined the relationships among EP, DP, wEP,
sEP, and Z-normality in the setting of intermediate predicate logics.
Here we make some remarks for further research topics.
1. We are working with the pure language L. In [2], Doorman considered
a property related to wEP in languages with function symbols. It must
be interesting to consider counterparts of sEP and Z-normality in such
languages. At present, we have only some partial results.
2. We have considered sEP as a weak variant of EP. It suggests that we can
introduce the sentential DP (sDP): if L ⊢ A∨B and A and B are sentences,
then either L ⊢ A or L ⊢ B. We can show that Z-normality and sDP are
independent in intermediate predicate logics; sDP 9 Z-normality, and Z-
normality9 sDP. But, with the constant domain axiom CD: ∀x(p(x)∨q) ⊃
∀xp(x) ∨ q, we can show that sDP implies Z-normality. The situation
including sDP and/or CD is not completely clear at present.
3. Let us say that a formula is axiomatically true in a Kripke model, if its
instances are all true in the model. The key concept of the proof of Theo-
rem 1.8 is the preservation of axiomatic truth of Lin and T under pointed
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extensions and pointed joins. (See also Minari [8] and Nakamura [9].) There
are several such formulas. For example,
MP : ∀x(p(x) ∨ ¬p(x)) ∧ ¬¬∃xp(x) ⊃ ∃xp(x),
LPO : ∀x(p(x) ∨ ¬p(x)) ⊃ ∃xp(x) ∨ ¬∃xp(x),
where p is a unary predicate variable. The former corresponds to Markov’s
principle in a logical axiomatic schema, and the latter to the limited prin-
ciple of omniscience. These formulas (axiom schemata) have been dis-
cussed in metamathematical investigations of constructive systems (cf. e.g.
Ishihara-Nemoto [4] and Troelstra-van Dalen [17]). Usually, EP and DP are
regarded as the distinguishing features of constructivity of H∗. Both MP
and LPO enlarge the concept of constructivity, particularly the concepts of
∨ and ∃ of intuitionistic logic. However, they still have EP and DP. Note
that Lin and ∃wT (a, b, w) do the same. This observation seems to suggest
a new insight into both fields: of intermediate logics and of metamathe-
matics of constructive systems, which would enhance our understanding of
∃, ∨, and the concept of constructivity.
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